Abstract This essay offers an introduction to Justus Lipsius's dialogue De Constantia, first published in 1584. Although the dialogue bears a superficial similarity to philosophical works of consolation, I suggest that it should be approached as a spiritual exercise written by Lipsius primarily for his own benefit.
Interest in the work of the Belgian humanist Justus Lipsius (1547 Lipsius ( -1606 has increased in recent years. For a time he was remembered primarily as a Latin textual scholar, having published important editions of the works of Tacitus and Seneca in 1574 and 1605, respectively. Now his work is receiving renewed attention on a number of fronts. He has benefited from a wider growth in neo-Latin studies as well as from the increased attention paid by classicists to the classical tradition. A number of new editions and reprints of his works either have recently appeared or are under way. Perhaps most significantly, J. B. Schneewind (1998: 170-75) , in his The InvenThanks to Jonathan Lavery for his insightful and constructive comments on an earlier draft. 1. Recent papers in English include Long 2003; Cooper 2004; Lagrée 2004; Papy 2004. 2. Publisher Georg Olms has recently issued a facsimile of the 1675 edition of Lipsius's Opera Omnia (Lipsius 2003 ). Lipsius's Politica has recently been edited and translated by Jan Waszink (Lipsius 2004) . I have recently edited John Stradling's translation of De Constantia (see Lipsius 2006) . Jill Kraye and Jan Papy are currently preparing a new edition of Lipsius's Manuductio. tion of Autonomy, has cited Lipsius as an important source for what he calls the tradition of moral perfectionism in early modern philosophy.
Notwithstanding this recent increase in attention, Lipsius remains a relatively unknown figure in the history of philosophy. In what follows, my aim is to examine Lipsius's principal philosophical work, the dialogue De Constantia, and to suggest how we might conceive the purpose of this work. On the assumption that neither the man nor the dialogue is especially well known, much of what follows will be devoted to introducing them both. I shall focus on those elements of De Constantia that provide some clues to the purpose of the work, and I shall consider this more directly at the end. As we shall see, although the dialogue shares a superficial similarity with philosophical works of consolation (such as Boethius's well-known dialogue), it also contains a number of hints that suggest that Lipsius saw the dialogue as a conversation with himself, conceived as a spiritual exercise. But before addressing these matters directly, it will be helpful to begin by introducing our author. As will emerge, both the central theme and the form of De Constantia were in part shaped by some of the tumultuous events in Lipsius's own life.
Lipsius's Life and Works
Who was Lipsius? Born in Overyssche, a village near Brussels and Louvain, in 1547, Joest Lips was educated by the Jesuits in Cologne and went on to the Catholic University of Louvain. After completing his education, he visited Rome, in the position of secretary to Cardinal Granvelle, staying there for two years in order to study the ancient monuments and explore the unsurpassed libraries of classical literature. In 1572 Lipsius's property in Belgium was taken by Spanish troops during the civil war while he was away on a trip to Vienna. This trip is in fact used as the backdrop for the dialogue De Constantia, which he wrote over a decade later. Without property, Lipsius applied for a position at the Lutheran University of Jena. (This was the first of a number of institutional moves that required Lipsius to change his publicly declared faith.) His new colleagues at Jena remained 3. For the Latin text, I have consulted the first edition (Lipsius 1584) and also Neumann's more recent edition (Lipsius 1998) . Quotations in English are from Stradling's translation as printed in Lipsius 2006 . All references to the text are by book and chapter. 4. The concept of a spiritual exercise has recently been brought to prominence in philosophical discussions by the work of Pierre Hadot (see esp. Hadot 1995) . The phrase derives from Ignatius of Loyola, but Hadot traces the concept's origins back to antiquity, on which see Sellars 2003: 110-18 . 5. For book-length surveys of Lipsius's life and works see Saunders 1955; Morford 1991; Lagrée 1994 . For further biographical details, see in particular Saunders 1955: 3-58. skeptical of this radical transformation, and Lipsius was eventually forced to leave Jena after only two years, in favor of Cologne. While at Cologne, he prepared notes on Tacitus that he used in his critical edition of 1574.
In 1576 Lipsius returned to Catholic Louvain. After his property was looted by soldiers a second time, he fled again in 1579, this time to the Calvinist University of Leiden. He remained at Leiden for thirteen years, and it is to this period that his two most famous books belong, namely, De Constantia Libri Duo (1584) and Politicorum sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex (1589) . However, Lipsius was by upbringing a Catholic, and after a brief period in Liège, eventually he sought to return to Louvain. In 1592 Lipsius accepted the chair of Latin history and literature at Louvain. To this final period belong his editorial work on Seneca and his two detailed studies of Stoicism, Manuductionis ad Stoicam Philosophiam and Physiologiae Stoicorum, both published in 1604, followed by his edition of Seneca in 1605. Lipsius died in Louvain in 1606. Among Lipsius's friends was his publisher, the famous printer Christopher Plantin, with whom he often stayed in Antwerp. Among his pupils was Philip Rubens, brother of the painter Peter Paul Rubens, who portrayed Lipsius after his death in the painting The Four Philosophers (now in the Pitti Palace, Florence). Among his admirers was Michel de Montaigne, who described him as one of the most learned men then alive.
Lipsius's primarily philosophical works, then, number just four, and they are all closely related to the philological labors that he devoted to Tacitus and Seneca. The earliest-and arguably most important-is De Constantia, a philosophical dialogue whose title echoes that of Seneca's De Constantia Sapientis. If De Constantia reflects Lipsius's fascination with Seneca, then his Politicorum sive Civilis Doctrinae reflects his interest in Tacitus. These two works form Lipsius's principal contribution to moral and political philosophy. His two later philosophical works, the Manuductio and the Physiologia, are devoted to the exposition of the philosophy of Stoicism and are presented as supplements to his edition of Seneca.
Lipsius's De Constantia
Although Lipsius is being paid increasing attention by historians of early modern philosophy (such as Schneewind), this attention often focuses more on his popularity and subsequent impact than it does on the specific contents of his philosophical works. Lipsius's De Constantia did prove to be especially popular in the late sixteenth and the seventeenth century, although it appears to have been little read since the eighteenth century. Given the relative obscurity into which this work has fallen, I shall begin with a survey of its principal topographical features. My aim is to highlight the inherent philosophical interest and literary merit of De Constantia rather than to focus upon its ancient sources or its subsequent influence. I shall suggest that in this work Lipsius is in fact engaged in a dialogue with himself, a dialogue that should be conceived as a spiritual exercise. But first, the dialogue itself.
De Constantia is a dialogue in two books. Published in 1584 (but completed in 1583), the dramatic date is 1572. The participants in the dialogue are Lipsius himself and his friend Langius-Charles de Langhe, canon of Liège. Langius, born around 1521, was about twenty-five years older than Lipsius (see Morford 1991: 64-66) . Langius plays the role of the older mentor, into whose mouth the positive content of the dialogue is placed, while Lipsius occupies the role of the novice in need of guidance. Accordingly, throughout the work Lipsius says very little in his own voice.
As a result, the dialectical possibilities of the dialogue form are hardly exploited at all. All the central ideas expressed in the work are placed into the mouth of the senior partner, who is invested with intellectual authority, while the junior partner contributes very little beyond the usual praise (of the "you speak well, Socrates" type) and the occasional minor objection that functions as a cue for greater detail on the point at hand. Lipsius's principal role within the dialogue is as narrator, recounting the extended diatribes of his older friend, but he also adopts the role of patient, recounting his symptoms for Langius to diagnose and then cure. These diatribes are of course written by Lipsius himself, and as we shall see, they are primarily directed toward himself. Although De Constantia may not deliver a sustained literary dialogue between two equally weighted interlocutors, it is nevertheless a philosophical dialogue in this quite different sense, namely, a dialogue between Lipsius the troubled patient in need of psychotherapy and Lipsius the Stoic, who possesses the necessary philosophical medicine. That this dialogue needs to take place reflects the fact that, although Lipsius may hold the cure, he has not yet digested it.
If Lipsius was primarily concerned with offering himself philosophical 8. From its publication in 1584 until 1705, De Constantia went through thirty-two Latin editions. During this period it was translated into English on four different occasions as well as being translated into French, German, Dutch, Spanish, and Polish. For details see Van Der Haeghen 1886: 73-138. 9 . None of the recent studies mentioned in note 1 above offer this. For previous outlines of the dialogue's contents, see Zanta 1914: 167-83; Spanneut 1973: 239-41; Oestreich 1982: 13-27; Morford 1991: 160-70. guidance, why did he choose to adopt the literary form of a dialogue? Did Lipsius have concerns about the wider reception of some of the ideas he wanted to present? Did he want, as an author, to hide behind the dramatic persona of Langius? A similar approach had been adopted by Petrarch who, in his Secretum, took the role of the novice and cast Augustine in the role of mentor.0 However, it is unlikely that Petrarch would have been concerned about making public the ideas he put into the mouth of his Augustine. As we shall see, some of the ideas that Lipsius wanted to address in De Constantia certainly did have the potential to be controversial, especially when it came to questions concerning the nature of fate. It is clear from the prefatory letter added to the second edition of 1585 that Lipsius was fully aware that he had his critics, but the process of defending himself against those critics necessarily involved acknowledging authorship of the contents of the dialogue. Rather than a desire to distance himself from the positive content of the work, there may have been other reasons why Lipsius gave Langius the principal role within the dialogue. As Mark Morford (1991: 161) suggests, it simply may have been an act of tribute to his old friend combined with a way for a still relatively young author to present his ideas using an older and more authoritative persona. In 1584 Lipsius was a mere thirty-six, far too young to take on the role of a Stoic sage.
The Problem of Public Evils
The dialogue between Lipsius and Langius takes place over two days, each occupying one of the two books that constitute the work. It opens (in Const. 1.1) with Lipsius, speaking in his own voice, recounting a trip to Vienna, during which he stopped off in Liège to visit Langius. (This trip did actually take place in 1572, the year in which the dialogue is set.) Lipsius recounts that the principal motivation for his trip was to escape the public evils (mala publica) of the civil war then plaguing his homeland Belgium. Langius's opening contribution to the dialogue immediately sets the agenda for the ensuing discussion: Lipsius is mistaken, Langius says, in thinking that fleeing troubles in Belgium will enable him to escape troubles completely; rather than run away from public evils, Lipsius should turn his attention inward and examine his own thoughts and emotions (Const. 1.2). The solution to public evils, Langius implies, is to be found in ethical psychotherapy rather than in travel or politics. The public evils that Lipsius hopes to flee are, Langius continues in 1.2, the product of "the smoke of opinions" ( fumo Opinionum), for which the cure is not travel but reason.
Langius develops his argument in a number of ways, building upon two claims. The first is that, if traveling were the way to escape pubic evils, then it would require traveling to a place completely free from such evils; such a place does not exist. The second is that, even if such a place did exist, settling there would offer no respite for the troubles afflicting Lipsius, for those troubles are ultimately the product of his own mind. Public evils are, Langius argues, internal rather than external (Const. 1.2). As such, traveling can never free us from them; only reason can cure Lipsius from the public evils that he is trying to escape. Langius cites a remark from Seneca's Letters attributed to Socrates: "How can you wonder your travels do you no good, when you carry yourself around with you?" With these claims, the Stoic character of Lipsius's thought as a whole is made clear. For Langius, the source of all human misery is "in here" rather than "out there"; moreover, we have complete control of "in here" and no control of "out there." Once we realize the true location of the source of our suffering, not only are we a step closer to being able to cure it, but we also suddenly realize that it is something that is "up to us." As the Stoic Epictetus put it:
Some things are up to us, while others are not up to us. Up to us are conception, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything that is our own doing; not up to us are our body, our property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is not our own doing. Furthermore, the things up to us are by nature free, unhindered, and unimpeded; while the things not up to us are weak, servile, subject to hindrance, and not our own. Remember, therefore, that if what is naturally slavish you think to be free, and what is not your own to be your own, you will be hampered, will grieve, will be in turmoil, and will blame both gods and men; while if you think only what is your own to be your own, and what is not your own to be, as it really is, not your own, then no one will ever be able to exert compulsion upon you, no one will hinder you, you will blame no one, will find fault with no one, will do absolutely nothing against your will, you will have no personal enemy, no one will harm you, for neither is there any harm that can touch you.
Constantia
The antidote to public evils is, of course, constancy (constantia). Constancy is defined in 1.4 as "a right and immovable strength of mind, neither lifted 12. Seneca, Epistulae 28.2; see also 104.7. Montaigne (1962: 234; 2003: 213) also made use of this passage; see Essais 1.39. 13. Epictetus, Enchiridion 1.1-3. Although Lipsius does not cite this passage in De Constantia, he does quote from elsewhere in the Enchiridion (e.g., at Const. 1.21).
up nor pressed down with external or causal accidents." It is an attitude of indifference to externals precisely of the sort proposed by Epictetus. This strength of mind is built upon rational judgment, in contrast to inconstancy, which is the product of mere opinion. The "true mother" of constancy is patience, defined as "a voluntary sufferance without grudging of all things whatsoever can happen to or in a man" (Const. 1.4). Here we see the foundations laid for the modern popular image of the Stoic heroically enduring whatever fate throws at him. The genuine Stoic, by contrast, suffers nothing, for he knows nothing bad can happen to him, no matter what fate may bring.
At this point it is worth noting that Lipsius's role in the dialogue remains minimal. He is the student in need of instruction, the patient in need of treatment. Young Lipsius says to Langius, "Lead me and learn me as you list; direct and correct me; I am your patient prepared to admit any kind of curing, be it by razor or fire, to cut or sear" (Const. 1.7). Langius fulfills the role of philosophical psychotherapist: "I will come nearer the matter and enquire into the causes of your sorrow" (ibid.). He continues in this vein by outlining two things that attack constancy: false goods and false evils. These are things that are deemed good and evil according to popular opinion but in fact should be of no concern to us. They are wealth, honor, and health, on the one hand, and poverty, infamy, and sickness, on the other. Thus they correspond to the preferred and non-preferred "indifferents" of ancient Stoic ethical theory. Langius's rejection of both of these classes of items makes clear that his is a hard-line version of Stoicism, closer to the tough-minded Stoic Aristo than to later, gentler Stoics such as Panaetius.
False goods and false evils are the source for four distinct emotions: desire and joy, fear and sorrow, respectively. Here we meet an echo of Cicero's analysis of the Stoic theory of emotions in the Tusculan Disputations (3.24-25). Desire and joy are the product of false goods either expected in the future or present right now; fear and sorrow, the product of false evils 14. " [Stoicism] is not a matter of gritting your teeth. It is about seeing things differently, so that you do not need to grit your teeth" (Sorabji 2000: 1) . 15. In Stoic ethical theory, all externals are classed as indifferents, neither inherently good nor bad (only virtue and vice have inherent moral value). However, the Stoics were prepared to admit that some of these indifferents might be preferable to others; health is preferable to sickness, wealth to poverty. For a brief overview, see Sellars 2006: 110-14. 16. Aristo's Stoicism is tough insofar as it downplays the significance of the distinction between preferred and non-preferred indifferents, focusing instead on virtue. Panaetius's Stoicism is gentler insofar as it downplays the ethical ideal of the sage and instead focuses on the behavior appropriate to the average human being. See Sellars 2006: 113 and 41, respectively. either expected or present now. Langius's aim, however, is not to recount the details of Stoic theory; it is to cure his patient Lipsius. Lipsius's distress is the product of false evils, and so Langius puts false goods to one side. False evils may be divided, as we have seen, into false evils present right now and those expected in the future, generating the emotions of sorrow and fear, respectively. They may also be divided into those that affect us individually and those that affect many people at one time-private and public evils. As we already know, the focus of the remainder of the dialogue will explore antidotes to public evils-war, famine, tyranny. The cure for such public evils-which are in fact false evils, the product of mere opinion-is, of course, constancy.
The Enemies of Constantia
Before turning to tackle public evils directly, Langius highlights three potential enemies of constancy: dissimulation, piety, and pity (Const. 1.8-12). Here the imagery shifts from that of medical therapy to that of a military battle: Langius will fight against the enemies of constancy; he is the captain of an army of arguments; these light skirmishes are merely a prelude to the main battle. Langius's transformation from doctor of the soul to military commander is unexpected, but it is worth noting that Langius's medical persona continues alongside his new martial one. He will continue to treat Lipsius's disturbed soul while at the same time repelling the dangerous opinions that assault his patient.
Dissimulation, the first enemy of constancy, consists in bemoaning public evils when in fact one's primary concern is with one's own private evils. People suffering from dissimulation are concerned only with what they will lose rather than with what is happening to their country as a whole. They are upset "not because the harm touches a great number, but because they themselves are of that number" (Const. 1.8). Langius cross-examines Lipsius about whether his grief is really for his homeland or merely for his own losses. When Lipsius objects to Langius's harsh words, Langius replies that the task at hand is not to be pleasant but rather to cure. The earlier medical imagery continues and is legitimized with a quotation from Epictetus: "The school of a philosopher is as a physician's shop" (Const. 1.10). Langius, the hard-line Stoic, is a tough doctor: "Do not look to me for roses, oils, or pepper, but for thorns, lancing tools, wormwood, and sharp vinegar" (ibid.).
Langius continues by suggesting that one way to overcome public evils is to adopt a cosmopolitan outlook, indifferent to the plights of traditional political states. In response to Langius's cosmopolitanism, Lipsius argues that his affection for his homeland is the product of a natural connection with the place of his birth. Langius replies by suggesting that this piety, the second enemy of constancy, is more the product of custom than nature. The boundaries and divisions between one country and another are the product of humankind, not nature. The laws and fortifications of our own country protect us, and this private benefit leads us to promote our homeland and become upset when it is under threat. The wealthy are usually more patriotic than their poorer fellow citizens precisely because the laws and defenses of the state secure their considerable possessions. In short, Langius argues that affection for one's country is the product of custom, not nature.
Part of Lipsius's sorrow for the suffering of his homeland is commiseration for the ordeals of his fellow countrymen. This is an instance of pity, the third enemy of constancy. As Langius puts it, it is bad enough to be emotionally unsettled by one's own mishaps, let alone the mishaps of others. Lipsius tries to defend pity, but Langius tackles this controversial issue head-on by continuing his exposition of a hard-line Stoicism. Pity is a malady, a "fault of an abject and base mind" (Const. 1.12). Mercy (the desire to assist others) is a fine virtue, but pity (bemoaning hardship with others) is not. This exchange between Lipsius and Langius in the dialogue touches on one of the sensitive points in Lipsius's own attempt to reconcile his Christian faith with his admiration for Stoic ethics.
Four Arguments against Public Evils
Having attempted to exorcise dissimulation, piety, and pity from the young Lipsius, Langius turns his attention to the central task: to overcome public evils. In the next chapter (Const. 1.13), Langius outlines four arguments against them. The military imagery returns: now that the light skirmishes are over, it is time to turn to the main battle; Langius's soldiers will be divided into four troops: First I will prove that these public evils are imposed upon us by God himself. Secondly, that they are necessary and by destiny. Thirdly, that they are profitable for us. Finally, that they be neither grievous nor strange. The first two arguments occupy the remainder of book 1. After a brief interlude, the remaining two arguments occupy the bulk of book 2.
The First Two Arguments
The first of the four arguments against public evils is dealt with swiftly in Const. 1.14. Langius argues that anyone who believes that this world is administered by God must accept that public evils are as much a part of his providential plan as anything else: "From heaven, Lipsius, from heaven are all these miseries sent" (Const. 1.14). A complaint about such miseries is ultimately a complaint against God. Moreover, if, for example, we lose our property, God is simply taking back what he himself has already given. The rest of God's creation does not complain; only humans are impudent enough to do so. And yet this struggle is pointless, for if we do not follow God's will freely, we shall be carried along forcibly. Here Langius echoes the famous Stoic dog-cart analogy credited to Cleanthes: a dog tied behind a cart can follow the cart willingly or unwillingly; if it is unwilling, it will simply be dragged along forcibly.
The three subsequent arguments are discussed by Langius and Lipsius at greater length. The second argument occupies them for the remainder of book 1 (chaps. 15-22). Alongside Providence, Langius now introduces necessity, which he presents as twofold.
First, there is the necessity that comes from the nature of things themselves. It is the nature of mortal beings that they will die; likewise, it is the nature of the world as a whole to be in a continual process of change. Even the apparently stable earth shifts and slides, old islands disappearing beneath the sea and new ones surfacing (Const. 1.16). If even the earth itself is in a continual process of generation and destruction, then it should come as little surprise to find towns, cities, and states subject to the same. Just as each human being experiences youth, maturity, old age, and then death, so too do these larger entities, comprised of human beings. Nothing is exempt from this continual flux, not even the so-called "eternal" city of Rome, now merely a ruin compared with its former glory.
Second, there is the necessity associated with fate. Here Langius steps up the military imagery: it is time to put down the hand weapons and take up the big artillery, confronting the enemy head-on. Indeed, what follows is the most important and complex section of the entire text. Langius 19. This analogy is reported fully in Hippolytus, Refutatio 1.21 (in Diels 1965: 571) , and echoed in Epictetus, Enchiridion 53, and Seneca, Epistulae 107.10. For discussion see Susanne Bobzien (1998: 345-57) , who argues that it is not wholly representative of early Stoic thinking about determinism.
begins by affirming the existence of fate, and the young Lipsius questions what he calls the feeble Stoic idea that the individual is in conflict with fate (viz., the dog tied to the cart). As we shall see, there are questions concerning whether this is in fact the standard Stoic position, but what is interesting to note here is that Lipsius the author distances Lipsius the character from the Stoic position. Langius replies by affirming a connection between Providence and fate. If we accept that God orders the world providentially and that he is of a constant mind, then we must agree that whatever God decrees to pass is fated to happen:
We must acknowledge him to be stayed, resolute, and immutable, always one, and like himself, not wavering or varying in those things which once he willed and foresaw. (Const. 1.17; Lipsius 1584: 53) Providence and fate are, argues Langius, united. However, this is a subject prone to confusion and error, so it is important to be precise. With this aim in mind, Langius proceeds to outline four distinct conceptions of fate: the "mathematical," the "natural," the "violent," and the "true." The first two of these are dispatched quickly: mathematical fate is the fate of astrology and divination, and Langius attributes it to the Chaldeans; natural fate is the natural order of causes as explicated by the Aristotelian tradition.
The third, violent fate, receives special attention. Langius attributes it to the Stoics, whom he calls "my friends," and suggests that the Stoic doctrine is in fact sound so long as it is interpreted properly. Unfortunately, popular opinion has charged the Stoics with impiety: the Stoics make God and our free will subject to fate, it is claimed. Langius admits that some Stoic sources do seem to suggest this, adding that other sources suggest a more palatable doctrine. Langius goes on to chastise Seneca for claiming that God "commanded once, but obeys [himself ] forever,"0 despite the fact that Langius has just made a very similar claim himself. Indeed, he then backtracks somewhat by suggesting that, in fact, Seneca merely makes God subject to God. Seneca's error, then, is merely in using a clumsy form of expression rather than in any genuine impiety. The Stoics regularly identify God with fate, and so the claim that God is subject to fate does not imply that God is restricted by some higher power. The charge that the Stoics make our free will subject to fate has also been shown to be wrong, says Langius, by Chrysippus himself. Interpreted correctly, then, the Stoic account of fate "differs not much from our true fate" (Const. 1.18).
20. Seneca, De Providentia 5.8. 21. This is a reference to Chrysippus's compatibilism, which reconciles free will and determinism by suggesting that, in our own free actions, fate is working through us. For further discussion, see Bobzien 1998: chap. 6. The fourth and final conception of fate is this "true" fate. Langius defines it as "an eternal decree of [God's] providence" and "the saying and commandment of God" (Const. 1.19). Providence and fate should not be equated with one another, we are now told. Fate, the necessary order of things within the world, is the product of Providence, which resides in God. Whereas Seneca spoke as if to imply that God was bound by fate, Langius insists that fate is beneath God and Providence in the metaphysical hierarchy. Like the Stoics, though, Langius proclaims that all events are subject to the necessity of fate, this being nothing other than God's will.
Thus far the distinction between Stoic "violent" fate properly interpreted and "true" fate is subtle, to say the least, if not merely a matter of expression. As Lipsius comments after Langius's lengthy exposition, "What slender kinds of distinctions are these? . . . For truly I cannot conceive how this fate that you describe differs from that of the Stoics" (Const. 1.20). Despite having spent much time arguing that there is nothing inherently wrong with the Stoic doctrine, Langius proceeds to object to any identification between his own "true" fate and Stoic fate. He suggests four points in which these true fates differ: (a) the Stoics make God subject to fate, (b) they posit an eternal natural order of causes, (c) they deny all contingency, and (d) they deny freedom of the will. Yet Langius has already shown that (a) is more a matter of expression than anything else; he has affirmed (b) himself; he has pointed out that (d) is simply a misrepresentation. That leaves just (c), the denial of contingency. The Stoics do indeed deny contingency, but Langius's version of contingency involves what he calls secondary causes and so is by no means uncaused. The Stoics themselves also draw distinctions between different types of causes as part of their compatibilist account of free will. The distance between Langius's position and that of the Stoics remains minimal, to say the least.
If we depart from De Constantia for a moment, it is interesting to note that in the Physiologiae Stoicorum Libri Tres, published twenty years later in 1604, Lipsius tackles the problem of the relationship between God and fate in Stoicism for a second time. In this later text, Lipsius offers an unequivocal defense of the Stoic theory of fate, although repeating the comment in De Constantia that occasionally these matters were "incautiously expressed." 22. Langius does not expand on what he means by secondary causes (secundae caussae) here. In the Physiologia, Lipsius will later discuss Chrysippus's theory of two types of causes, on which see Lagrée 1994: 64. However, given that Langius is outlining a position that he wants to contrast with the Stoic position, it is unclear whether his secondary causes should be understood along Chrysippean lines. 23. Again, see Bobzien 1998: chap. 6. 24 . See the Physiologia 1.12 (Lipsius 1604b: 28-32) . This chapter has been translated into English in Zanchius 1930: 154-60. In support of both his admiration for the Stoic theory and his leniency with regard to forms of expression, Lipsius cites an unimpeachable Christian authority, Saint Augustine: "No great effort need be expended in debate with them [the Stoics] on a verbal difference, inasmuch as they ascribe this order and chain, as it were, of causes to the will and power of the supreme God." It has been suggested that Lipsius offered a revised account of Stoic fate in this later work (e.g., Saunders 1955: 54-55), but in fact there is no great distance between the substance of his two accounts.
Returning to De Constantia, Langius completes the complex discussion of fate by reminding the young Lipsius that all he needs to remember is that public evils are the product of necessity. As such, there is nothing to be gained from bemoaning their inevitable presence.
To which, in the final chapter of book 1, Lipsius raises an objection. If all events are the product of necessity, then why try to work toward particular outcomes? Why bother to do anything at all? This is a version of the so-called "lazy argument" raised against Stoic determinism in antiquity. Langius's response echoes the Stoic replies to the same argument, in particular the replies attributed to Chrysippus in Cicero's De Fato. Like Chrysippus, Langius draws a distinction between two types of causes in order to argue that human actions do play a part in the outcome of events. Yet despite this, it is important to accept that some events remain out of our control and must be embraced as the will of God. With this, the discussion is brought to a close by a call to supper and a promise that the discussion will continue the following day. So ends book 1.
The Garden Interlude
At the opening of book 2, Langius and Lipsius take a walk in Langius's garden (Const. 2.1-2.3). Lipsius congratulates Langius on his fine and perfectly tended garden, and this leads into an extended eulogy devoted to gardens. Since Adam himself, the garden has been humankind's God-given home. The great pagan authors of antiquity also praised the garden as a place where one can escape the crowds and the complexities of city life (Const. 2.2). It is a place where the senses can enjoy a feast of colors and scents (ibid.).
Langius is not altogether comfortable with this account of the benefits of gardens, however, and goes on to criticize those obsessive cultivators of gardens who chase after exotic specimens as just one more way in which they 25. Augustine, De Civitate Dei 5.8. 26. See Cicero, De Fato 28-29, with Bobzien 1998: 182-98. may display their wealth. And once they have created their ostentatious gardens, they merely laze around in them. In contrast, Langius suggests that the garden is not a place to enjoy sensory delights; rather, it is a place to rest the mind (Const. 2.3). It is a place to withdraw into when one has become tired by the business of everyday life (ibid.). It is a place for quiet meditation, for reading and writing, and for recuperation (ibid.). In short, it is a place for Stoic mental training rather than Epicurean pleasure.
The conversation about gardens is followed by a warning about philology. Although it may be pleasant to draw upon the ancient poets and historians in their discussion, Langius reminds Lipsius that the task at hand is philosophical rather than merely philological (ibid.). While there is nothing wrong in wanting to be learned, it is far better to be wise. Philology-the study of ancient texts-must not become an end in itself; it must remain the servant of philosophy-the art of living. Here we find an echo of a warning made by Seneca: criticizing students more interested in disputation than in philosophy, Seneca comments, "Thus the study of wisdom ( philosophia) has become the study of words ( philologia)." Lipsius the author (and the editor of Tacitus) has Langius say, "Why do you correct the writings of Tacitus, if your own life is uncorrected?" (Const. 2.4). This piece of oblique self-criticism is a striking example of Lipsius the author in dialogue with himself, reminding himself that his primary loyalty must be to philosophy, not philology.
The Third Argument
After this interlude, Langius and Lipsius return to the discussion of the previous day, turning to the third of Langius's four arguments against public evils (Const. 2.6-2.17). Alongside the legions of Providence and necessity deployed the previous day, Langius now adds profit as his next weapon. Public evils are in fact profitable for us and as such are not genuine evils at all (Const. 2.6). This should come as no surprise given that they ultimately come from God, who is fundamentally a source of goodness. As such, the public evils under discussion may be divided into two sorts. The first come directly from God without human involvement, examples of which would be famines or earthquakes (Const. 2.7). The second also come ultimately from God but involve human agency, such as tyranny or war (ibid.). While public evils of this second sort are built out of human weaknesses, nevertheless God is able to put them to profitable use. He does so in three ways: they may be exercising, chastising, or punishing (Const. 2.8). Just as the cap-27. Seneca, Epistulae 108.23. tain of a ship must experience violent storms in order to master the skills of seamanship, so too must we experience adversity if we are to master life. Without adversity we shall not have the opportunity to develop our own virtue. Here Langius repeats a phrase from Seneca's De Providentia, attributed to Demetrius the Cynic (ibid.): "I account nothing more unfortunate than that man which never had feeling of adversity." This quotation is significant, for much of the material presented as the third argument echoes material laid out by Seneca in that work.
As well as being a form of necessary training, public evils also function as chastisement for those of us in need of correction and punishment for those who are thoroughly vicious. Langius adds to these a fourth end of public evils, which he acknowledges will appear even more obscure to the human mind. It may well be that public evils form a necessary-and perhaps even beautiful-component of God's overall plan (Const. 2.11). This should not be discounted just because human understanding may not be able to grasp in what way this may be the case. It may well be that it is necessary for some parts to perish in order to preserve the order and beauty of the whole.
The young Lipsius interjects by questioning the justice of such natural punishments (Const. 2.12). Are not the guilty often left unpunished? Are not the innocent often punished unjustly? Why are later generations often apparently punished for the acts of their ancestors? Langius responds to each of these challenges in turn. Although the guilty may not appear to be punished immediately, God never overlooks the actions of the wicked, who all receive what they deserve in due course (Const. 2.13). Although some punishments may be external and so observable, others may be internal and so hidden, while others may be postponed until the next life (Const. 2.14-2.15). Turning to Lipsius's claim that the innocent are sometimes punished unjustly, Langius responds by arguing that no one is free from error or vice (Const. 2.16). This of course echoes the Christian doctrine of original sin, but it also echoes the Stoic claim that, given how rare the perfect sage is, practically all humankind are in a state of imperfection, being "madmen and fools, impious and lawless, at the extremity of misfortune and utter unhappiness." As for the transfer of punishments, Langius simply notes that there is little objection to the practice of future generations inheriting the titles, land, and wealth of their ancestors (Const. 2.17). If it is acceptable to transfer these benefits, then it should be equally acceptable for God to transfer punishments (ibid.). So ends the third argument against public evils. 
The Fourth Argument
Langius proceeds to his fourth and final argument without pause. The public evils currently under discussion are, says Langius, neither grievous nor unusual. Here the medical imagery returns (Const. 2.18-2.26). After the sharp and bitter pills of philosophical argument, it is now time for gentler medicines offered by philology. While Lipsius the author has made considerable use of his philological learning throughout the text thus far, it is during this final argument that he deploys it to the greatest effect. We have been warned earlier (Const. 2.4-5) that philology-the study of ancient texts-must remain in the service of philosophy-the art of living-and that warning is repeated again here. In what follows, Lipsius the author shows just how he thinks philology might be put to work for a philosophical end.
Langius offers two arguments for the claim that public evils are neither grievous nor unusual. The first argument is by reason, the second by comparison. In the first argument, Langius asks Lipsius to think impartially about his fears. Losing one's property is simply a return to one's initial propertyless condition (Const. 2.19). One may fear death at the hands of a tyrant, forgetting that we are at risk of death at the hands of Nature every day (ibid.). It is in the second argument, though, that we see Lipsius the author deploy the full force of his philological learning in the service of philosophy. There, Langius offers the young Lipsius a series of examples taken from history in order to show that the present public evils are nothing unusual and not especially severe. He begins (in Const. 2.21) by listing the thousands slaughtered in the wars of the ancient Jews: 20,000 at Caesarea, 13,000 at Scythopolis, 2,500 at Ascalon, 2,000 at Ptolomais, 50,000 at Alexandria, 10,000 at Damascus, and so on. He then proceeds to Greek and Roman history, outlining the violent battles recounted in the ancient historians. Drawing upon Procopius and other sources, Langius continues with graphic descriptions of ancient plagues and famines, of which just one gruesome example from a famine will suffice:
Two women (I quake to speak it) killed seventeen men in the night by treachery and did eat them; at length they themselves were slain by the eighteenth, who perceived the matter. (Const. 2.23)0 30. Lipsius 1584: 149, citing Procopius, De Bellis 6.20.27-29. Note that in the first edition of 1584 this chapter is 2.22, not the 2.23 that we find in Stradling's translation. The first edition has twenty-six chapters in book 2, but the third edition of 1586 has twenty-seven, having subdivided the original chapter 14. Stradling's translation was clearly based upon one of the later editions.
Cruelty is nothing new either, Langius says, citing examples from Valerius Maximus (Const. 2.24). Here we see Lipsius the author drawing upon his impressive knowledge of ancient history and literature to furnish us with numerous examples to support his claim that public evils such as civil war, tyranny, famine, and plague are by no means limited to the present age. All of these public evils are constant features of history, so we should not be surprised to find them in our own time. Indeed, it would be truly miraculous if our own time were exempt from such events. All countries and all ages have had their share of public evils; so must our country and our age.
In this fourth argument, we find a version of the idea that has come to be known as "moral distance." This is the idea that we tend to care more for those things closer to us than those far away, and it is traditionally credited to David Hume. Our natural sympathy for those closest at hand, it is suggested, is a distortion that we must overcome when making moral judgments. When we step back and reflect, we acknowledge that our assessments should not be affected by this "moral distance." Langius's fourth argument deploys a similar idea. Whereas contemporary discussions of moral distance try to show that we should give as much assistance to those far away as we do to those nearby, however, Langius's argument has a quite different goal. His aim is to show that moral distance can distort our perception of public evils, making our own troubles appear much worse than they actually are. If we step back and consider those evils within a wider historical context, we shall see that in fact they are neither especially grievous nor unusual. Here, then, the idea of "moral distance" is deployed not in order to encourage us to assist others but, rather, in order to help us put our own troubles into a wider context. With all four of Langius's troops of soldiers deployed, the discussion draws to a close. Langius reminds Lipsius that his aim has been to benefit Lipsius, not to delight him; to be profitable, not pleasing (Const. 2.27). Through Langius, Lipsius reminds himself that it is not enough merely to hear these arguments; he must digest them so that they enter into his mind. In order to achieve this, he should repeat them to himself often, for 31. See Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, book 3, part 3, section 1 (1978: 581): "We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us: With our acquaintance, than with strangers: With our countrymen, than with foreigners. But notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England. They appear equally virtuous, and recommend themselves equally to the esteem of a judicious spectator." 32. This has something in common with what Hadot (1995: 238-50) calls "the view from above." just one hearing will not be enough to effect the existential change that is required if Lipsius is to overcome the suffering associated with public evils. The task at hand is a transformation "not in words and appearance, but in deed and fact" (ibid.).
Lipsius in Dialogue with Himself
At first glance, what we appear to have in De Constantia is a dialogue of consolation, specifically a dialogue where Langius offers consolation to the young Lipsius in the face of public evils. It is tempting to suggest a parallel with Boethius's Philosophiae Consolationis. These two works share a number of features beyond their apparent consolatory goal. In both works the author acts as narrator, reporting an encounter and discussion with a figure invested with significant intellectual authority-in Boethius's case, with Philosophy personified as a woman. In each case, the author becomes the pupil to this master, and the positive argument of the work is credited to the master figure. Both dialogues also happen to include a discussion of the Stoic theory of fate. However, without wanting to make any substantive claims about the nature of Boethius's work, I shall suggest that it would be a mistake to conceive Lipsius's dialogue as primarily a work of consolation.
One might also be inclined to assume that Lipsius's use of the character Langius as a mouthpiece for the positive views advanced in the dialogue reflects an attempt to distance himself from the potentially controversial material under discussion, especially the Stoic theory of fate. However, as we have seen, the distance between the Stoic theory and the position outlined by Langius is minimal, to say the least, notwithstanding the explicit declarations proclaiming otherwise. Thus it seems unlikely that self-distancing was Lipsius's principal motivation for using the dialogue form in the way that he does.
In contrast to these sorts of proposals, I suggest that in De Constantia Lipsius is in fact engaging in a dialogue with himself: a dialogue between Lipsius the Stoic philosopher, who knows what needs to be done in order to overcome public evils, and Lipsius the imperfect human being, who still has a long way to go before he can claim to possess wisdom. Thus we might say that it is a work of philosophical psychotherapy, following in the wake of ancient and Renaissance precursors such as Petrarch's De Remediis. Lipsius has no desire to preach Stoic wisdom in his own voice, for he is all 33. This work is translated in Petrarch 1991 and discussed as a psychotherapeutic text (in the etymological sense of the word) in Panizza 1991. too aware that he has much work to do on that front in his own life. He is, as Epictetus would put it, a student who is "making progress," someone who has mastered the philosophical doctrines of Stoicism but who still needs much training if he is to translate those doctrines into actions. It is relatively easy, Epictetus suggests, to comprehend philosophical theories; the difficult task is to practice them in one's everyday conduct. Yet as Epictetus's teacher Musonius Rufus put it, just as medical theories are useless unless they are used to cultivate health in the body, so philosophical theories are useless if they are not used to cultivate health in the soul. We have seen Lipsius make use of this sort of medical imagery, explicitly casting himself in the role of patient. We have also seen him emphasize the need to keep in mind the fundamentally practical goal of the task at hand. Indeed, in De Constantia's prefatory note "To the Reader," Lipsius distances himself from those who use philosophy "as a divertissement, not as a remedy, and turn the most serious instrument of life into a sportage with trifles."
As one who is "making progress," Lipsius is in need of some form of training that will enable him to move from theoretical understanding to the far more important practical mastery. The De Constantia is in effect Lipsius's attempt to train himself; it is a dialogue with himself in which he tries to "digest" the philosophical theories that he already knows. It is what might be called, following Pierre Hadot (1995: 81-125) , a "spiritual exercise." Hadot borrows this phrase from the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola, but he suggests that the concept may be traced back to antiquity. Just as a physical exercise is an exercise for the body, so a spiritual exercise is an exercise for the soul. The Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus (Hense 1905: 25-26 ) provides a summary of what he calls "training for the soul" (askêsis tês psuchês) that resonates with Lipsius's practical concerns:
Training which is peculiar to the soul consists first of all in seeing that the proofs pertaining to apparent goods as not being real goods are always ready at hand and likewise those pertaining to apparent evils as not being real evils, and in learning to recognize the things which are truly good and in becoming accustomed to distinguish them from what are not truly good. In the next place it consists of practice in not avoiding any of the things which only seem evil, and in not pursuing any of the things which only seem good; in shunning by every 34. On the relationship between doctrines (logoi) and training (askêsis) in Stoic philosophy, see Sellars 2003 : esp. chap. 5. 35. See Musonius fr. 3 in Hense 1905 . See the "Ad Lectorem," in the unnumbered opening pages of Lipsius 1584; translated in Lipsius 2006: 28-29. 37 . On the theme of "digesting" philosophical theories see Epictetus, Enchiridion 46; Dissertationes 3.21.1-4; Seneca, Epistulae 2.2-4, together with Sellars 2003: 121-22. means those which are truly evil and in pursuing by every means those which are truly good.
A spiritual exercise is thus that which translates proofs concerning what is good and bad into behavior based upon those proofs. It is that which translates philosophical doctrines into philosophical actions. We might say that the function of a spiritual exercise is to accustom or to habituate the soul according to philosophical doctrines or principles, to absorb philosophical ideas into one's character which, in turn, will transform one's life.
This process of habituation, Marcus Aurelius suggests, can be achieved only by repeated reflection. In order to illustrate this, he characterizes the process in terms of "dyeing" one's soul, just as a piece of cloth might be dyed a new color: "As are your repeated imaginations so will your mind be, for the soul is dyed by its imaginations. Dye it, then, in a succession of imaginations like these." Thus Marcus Aurelius's Meditations often repeat certain themes again and again, just as Lipsius says that he must in the closing chapter of De Constantia.
Alongside this theme of habituation, one also finds the use of an analogy with the digestion of food. In his letters to Lucilius, Seneca advises his young correspondent to focus upon a number of select texts, rather than read too widely, and to digest these select works, "for food does no good and is not assimilated into the body if it leaves the stomach as soon as it is eaten, and nothing hinders a cure so much as frequent change of medicine." Each day, Seneca continues, "after you have run over many thoughts, select one to be thoroughly digested that day."0 According to Lipsius's favorite Stoic, philosophical principles only attain value once they have been digested. Just as food transforms and becomes part of the body only once it has been digested, so philosophical nourishment must be digested before it can become part of the soul, transforming one's character and ultimately one's behavior.
In antiquity, these sorts of exercises were often associated with a written text, either the reading of a text or the writing of a text. The Handbook of Epictetus is an example of a text the reading of which might form a spiritual exercise. The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius form an example of a text the writing of which formed a spiritual exercise for the philosopher-38. Musonius Rufus fr. 6. 39. Marcus Aurelius 5.16; see also 3.4: "dyed with justice to the core." Note also Seneca Epistulae 71.31. 40. Seneca, Epistulae 2.2-4; see also 84.5-8. 41. For further discussion of writing as a form of spiritual exercise, see Sellars 2003: 126-28. emperor. The former is a guidebook for philosophical apprentices; the latter is a text produced by an apprentice. I suggest that Lipsius's De Constantia is an example of the second type of text, close in purpose to the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. It also shares something with the Meditations of Descartes and the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius of Loyola. It differs from these works, however, in using the dialogue form. This difference reflects Lipsius's humanistic learning, the dialogue being the classic form for humanistic Latin texts.
In this light, we should not be misled by Lipsius's decision to write a dialogue. The real philosophical dialogue at work here is not the staged discussion between the characters Langius and Lipsius; instead it resides in the dialogue that Lipsius is engaged in with himself. Lipsius (2006: 28-30) confirms this in his note "To the Reader": all of his endeavors, he says, have been directed toward the goal of achieving a "peaceable and quiet mind," and De Constantia is his principal effort in that direction. Strikingly, he adds that "I have written many other things for others, but this book chiefly for myself; the former for fame, but this for profit." He does not expect large numbers of readers; "a few readers are enough, one is enough, none is enough" (Satis mihi pauci lectores, satis est unus, satis est nullus). This phrase, set in emphatic Roman characters in an otherwise italic text, captures the thought that in De Constantia Lipsius is ultimately writing for his own benefit, in dialogue with himself. If even no readers are enough, then it must be the act of writing itself that Lipsius found to be profitable for his own philosophical progression from apprentice to sage. The fact that Lipsius decided to publish this dialogue with himself suggests that the process was indeed profitable; no doubt he thought that its example could also be profitable to us, his readers. 42 . At Dissertationes 2.1.29-33, Epictetus recommends this form of philosophical writing to his students, in contrast to merely rhetorical prose aimed at nothing more than securing the praise of one's readers. For further discussion of this form of written spiritual exercise, see Foucault's "L'écriture de soi" (1994, 4:415-30) . 43. For a reading of both of these works arguing for the influence of Ignatius on Descartes, see Vendler 1989. 44 . One feature that De Constantia does share with these two works is the division of the discussion into days, on which see Vendler 1989: 200. However, this feature can also be found in ancient dialogues, such as Cicero's Tusculan Disputations. 45. This can be seen in Renaissance texts by authors such as Petrarch and Valla, who take their inspiration from Cicero (who was, of course, following the example set by Plato). Even Lipsius's beloved Seneca gestures toward the dialogue form, although he does not exploit its full potential. Despite Lipsius's preference for Seneca over Cicero in matters of Latin style, the structure of De Constantia as a whole holds onto a broadly Ciceronian form.
